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ABSTRACT
The distinctness of each person’s life and experience is an important
consideration in dominant accounts of how democratic institutions
should distribute basic rights and liberties. Drawing on recent social
movements, philosophers like Iris Marion Young, Miranda Fricker,
and Axel Honneth have nonetheless drawn attention to the
distinctive claims and challenges that plurality and difference
entrain in democratic societies by analysing how the dominant
discourses on rights and justice tend to elide, obscure, or reify the
lived experiences of individuals belonging to disadvantaged and
oppressed groups. In this essay, I offer an independent
justification for why we should take such lived experiences
seriously. I show how the lived experiences of disadvantaged and
oppressed individuals can be a resource for deep and meaningful
social change. I propose a distinctive kind of social change in
which the disadvantaged and oppressed themselves drive the
process of transformation whereby they change the oppressive
frames of difference relating to their race, class, sex, or ability. I
call this kind ‘organic social change’. I also show that organic
social change is distinctively important in that the disadvantaged
and oppressed get to enact an empowering mode of cooperation
that harnesses their singularities when they are the ones driving
the process of their own and one another’s transformations.
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Introduction
The distinctness of each person’s life and experience figures as an important consideration
for recent accounts of rights and justice as a basis for democratic institutions. In John
Rawls’s A theory of justice, for example, the plurality and distinctness of individual
persons are taken seriously in at least two important respects. One, the conception of
justice as fairness turns on a conception of society as comprising a plurality of distinct
persons, whose separate systems of ends are accorded equal weight in an original agree-
ment rather than being conflated, as in the case of utilitarianism, into the system of
desires of an impartial sympathetic spectator. Two, a social system in which the principle
of equal liberty and the difference principle operate effects a fair distribution of primary
social goods – that is, rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth – such
that each person can reasonably expect enough share of such goods as would allow
them to improve their own life prospects (1999, 79–81). Under such a social system, no
one is expected to sacrifice their own life prospects for the sake of others, and everyone
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develops a sense of their own value from being able to carry out their own rational plan of
life.
Among political theorists who draw influence from critical theory, however, this distri-
butive paradigm elides or reifies crucial facets of human life and human experience. Citing
one criticism from radical democratic theorists, Iris Marion Young has pointed out that
the distributive paradigm ‘implicitly defines human beings as primarily consumers,
desirers, and possessors of goods’ (1990, 36). Insofar as human beings are also doers
and actors, she then argues, their claims for social justice also enjoin attention on what
structural conditions might promote the following experiences and endeavours:
learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings; participating
in forming and running institutions, and receiving recognition for such participation; playing
and communicating with others, and expressing our experience, feelings and perspective on
social life in contexts where others can listen. (1990, 37)
It is through such experiences and endeavours that the new left social movements of the
1960s and 1970s came to have an emancipating and empowering import for oppressed
groups. Hence, for Young, social justice calls for democratic institutions and processes
in which oppressed groups in particular are able to assert a positive sense of difference
– that is, one that need not entail exclusion, opposition, or domination but rather
simply expresses the hitherto unacknowledged difference or speciﬁcity of the life experi-
ence, social perspective, and culture of oppressed groups. In lieu of Rawls’s liberal plural-
ism, she advances a radical democratic pluralism that ‘acknowledges and afﬁrms the
political signiﬁcance of social group difference as a means of ensuring the participation
and inclusion of everyone in social and political institutions’ (1990, 168).
A similar commitment to pluralism animates the work of Miranda Fricker. In her own
analysis of injustice, Fricker embarks from a pluralism that is ‘capable of honouring the
everyday insight that social differences give rise to differences in the perspectives in
which the world is viewed, and that power can be an influence in whose perspectives
seem rational (2000, 160). With this framework, she analyses a kind of injustice that
obtains when those who are powerless are unable to fully make sense of their experiences
because the collective social understandings favour the experiences of those with power.
She calls this ‘hermeneutic injustice’. She then uses this to explain the political significance
of the speakouts that marked the early years of the women’s movement: distinctive social
experiences whose nature and significance had initially been obscure to the women who
experienced them had to be shared in settings where people listened to one another,
attending not only to what was said, but also to what they could not yet articulate (2007).
More recently, Axel Honneth observes that insofar as social criticism has focused
mainly on whether social arrangements satisfy certain principles of justice, it has ‘lost
sight of the fact that a society can demonstrate a moral deficit without violating generally
valid principles of justice’ (2008, 84). Here, Honneth is referring specifically to the increas-
ing reification of social relations and social life. Reification refers to how a person’s life
comes to be either treated or experienced as thing-like such that it loses both its human
and humane character. This phenomenon manifests, for example, in the convenient
images in which people typecast, say, those who are black, female, or gay, or in the
stance that such typecast individuals end up adopting towards themselves. In his final
analysis, Honneth defines reification as a kind of forgetting:
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we lose the ability to understand immediately the behavioural expressions of other persons as
making claims on us – as demanding that we react in an appropriate way… [because] we
lack, so to speak, the feeling of connection that would be necessary for us to be affected by
the expressions we perceive. (2008, 57–8)
These alternative approaches tonormative social theory and social criticismpoint to other
crucial respects in which each person’s life and experience is distinct from every other –
specifically, by virtue of their social group identification (Young), their different perspectives
on social experiences (Fricker), or their distinctive claims for recognition (Honneth). That
such expressions of difference can be inhibited, distorted, or unrecognised, particularly for
those who are black, poor, female, or disabled, is what Young, Fricker, and Honneth fore-
ground in their respective analyses of oppression, hermeneutic injustice, and reification.
In alluding specifically to the significance of social movements, these theorists also point
out how the experiences of those who are disadvantaged and oppressed can serve as a power-
fulmotivating force and important resource for driving processes of social changewhose sig-
nificance goes beyond merely securing certain rights, liberties, and opportunities.
In line with these approaches, my main thrust in the present essay is to provide a fine-
grained account of a particular conception of difference – that is, the singularity of each
person’s lived experiences – and demonstrate its significance for contemporary social
theory. More specifically, I show how the lived experiences of people who are disadvan-
taged and oppressed can be a resource for deep and creative forms of social change.
Out of their own lived experiences, disadvantaged and oppressed people can harness
their own powers to think, express the powers of their own feelings, and develop
powers to make their own decisions and to act on them. On my account, there is a distinc-
tive kind of social change that comes about through a process whereby the disadvantaged
and oppressed drive their own transformation and facilitate a similar transformation in
those individuals with whom they interact or cooperate. Crucially, moreover, these trans-
formations are towards new ways of being different, rather than towards simply getting
assimilated into mainstream society. I call this kind ‘organic social change’.
What orients and sustains the disadvantaged and oppressed throughout the process of
organic social change is their deep yearning to change oppressive frames of difference, that
is, ways of framing their race, class, sex, or ability that perpetuate their disadvantage and
oppression. People who are black, poor, female, or disabled get treated as inferior, lazy,
servile, abnormal, or inept, respectively, not by virtue of their actual characteristics, but
solely by virtue of their membership in their respective groups. Individuals belonging to
these groups therefore get framed as ‘different’ in ways that impose significant constraints
on how they experience their lives.
I have two main aims in this essay. My first aim is to characterise a distinctive form of
social change, which I call organic social change. The process of organic social change is
distinguished both by ‘what’ it changes (namely, oppressive frames of difference) and by
‘how’ what changes is changed (namely, by the disadvantaged and oppressed themselves).
To accomplish this first aim, I begin in §1 by delineating the features of organic social
change and providing a concrete historical example to illustrate these features. In this
way, I demonstrate that the category is not empty. To further distinguish organic social
change, I next contrast it, in §2, with a different process of social change in which oppres-
sive frames of difference are again what is changed, but not by the disadvantaged and
oppressed themselves (i.e. the ‘how’ differs).
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My second main aim is to show that organic social change is not only distinctive, but
also distinctively valuable and important. I do this in §3, by focusing on the empowering
kind of cooperation that the disadvantaged and oppressed get to enact when they are the
ones driving the process of their own and one another’s transformations. I conclude in §4
and §5 by addressing two objections to my account.
§1 Organic social change
‘Organic social change’ refers to a process in which people who are disadvantaged and
oppressed recast the oppressive frames of difference relating to their race, class, sex, or
ability. In organic social change, the disadvantaged and oppressed abide by three inter-
twining principles: (i) they should harness the powers and possibilities that their own
lived experiences and interactions afford;1 (ii) their commitment to change in their
society should be stronger than their feeling for self;2 and (iii) in order to change in
their society, they should change that society. My discussion will focus on a specific
type of organic social change, a subset of its instances, in which the process gets initiated
and facilitated by certain individuals, whom I shall call ‘facilitators’.
‘Frames of difference’ refer to prevailing frames of understanding that mark out people
who are black, poor, female, or disabled for differential treatment on the basis of com-
monly held beliefs about how these individuals behave, and about how individuals belong-
ing to privileged social groups generally behave towards them. Individuals who do not
belong to privileged social groups are thus framed as ‘different’ in ways that impose sig-
nificant constraints on how they experience their lives. Such individuals typically
undergo a formative experience in which they must live through what it is like to be dis-
advantaged and oppressed on account of how their difference gets framed in society. In the
midst of such a lived experience, the searing pain that ensues compels such individuals to
examine and understand the frame of difference that has triggered it. However, no matter
how hard they try to understand, say why ‘the negro has never done anything for himself’,3
they would not in fact be able to. Inasmuch as their understanding gives out, they come
out of this lived experience with a deep yearning to change oppressive frames of difference.
To the extent that reason proves of no avail to their suffering, the individuals who do
inhabit and endure such a searing lived experience also awaken to mental and bodily
powers more primal than reason. I suggest three primal powers in particular. First is
the absolute kind of presence to what they are experiencing that I will simply call attune-
ment. They develop this power of attunement from the emotional sensitivity with which
their bodies register what they are experiencing, and from the attention with which they
direct their minds to what they are experiencing. Such sensitivity and attention notwith-
standing, their attempt to understand what they are living through must fail. Surviving
that attempt, however, would indicate to them that even as what had drawn their attention
and sensitivity proved intractable, it was not the same as what moved them to invest that
degree of attention and sensitivity in their lived experience. They thereby intuit a second
primal power, namely, the strength of their determination to understand what they were
living through. This determination grounds them in their desire to change oppressive
frames of difference, and in the correlative conviction of what is truly important to
them. The last power they develop is an attitude of open and abiding patience towards
themselves, other people, and the world they live in, as evinced by how they rose from
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the searing pain they endured more with a sense of quandary combined with yearning
than with a thirst for vengeance against a personal injury.
Whereas all human beings have powers of attention, sensitivity, and determination,
only a few individuals can express these powers to such a degree as to blossom into the
kind of patience I just described in the course of their lived experience of oppression.
Hence, among these exceptional individuals, the yearning to change oppressive frames
of difference that takes root in formative experiences of oppression would, over time,
ripen into distinctive sensibilities conducive to organic social change. I shall refer to
these individuals as facilitators of organic social change, or simply facilitators.
Insofar as a facilitator abides by the second principle of organic social change (a com-
mitment to change in society that is stronger than her feeling for self), the process by
which she recasts oppressive frames of difference necessarily implies more than her
own personal transformation. She must find individuals with whom to cooperate who
share her yearning to change oppressive frames of difference. Insofar as she and these
other individuals abide by the third principle of organic social change, they know that
they cannot change in their society unless they change that society. They also understand
that to change society, they must initiate a struggle for social change that involves as many
people as possible. They must therefore immerse themselves in the communities of people
who are also disadvantaged and oppressed. It is in the course of such immersion that facil-
itators draw people who are disadvantaged and oppressed into organic social change.
To further illustrate the distinguishing features of organic social change, I will now
analyse a concrete historical example. In the early 1960s, student organisers belonging
to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) organised and empowered
disadvantaged and oppressed blacks across the state of Mississippi.4 As a result of their
efforts, close to 60% of black Mississippians registered to vote in 1968 compared to 5%
in 1956 (Lichtman 1969, 353). To this day, Mississippi’s voter turnouts in presidential
elections often vie with those of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Massachusetts in spite of
its low levels of income and education relative to the latter states. From the end of Recon-
struction until 1962, white Mississippians had framed black people in Mississippi as
apathetic, apolitical buffoons. Today, in spite of high voter turnouts among African-
Americans across the state, Mississippi remains a red state precisely because white Missis-
sippi now sees black people as active voting citizens.
These developments trace back to a course of events that began in summer of 1962,
when a feisty and energetic 23-year old named Sam Block set out to launch a voter regis-
tration campaign in Leflore, Mississippi. When he set out to do this, Block had neither
conducted such a campaign nor organised a movement in his life. Nor did he know
what response from the black community awaited him there. All he knew in fact was
the high likelihood of reprisals against any black person who dared to challenge the
white power structure.
As soon as Block found a place to stay in Greenwood, the seat of Leflore county, he went
straight into canvassing, ‘just talking to people in the community about voter education
and registration [as a way of] testing the pulse of people’ (1986). From those casual con-
versations, Block learned that many black people in Leflore were either frightened or angry
about their social situation. Even so, most of the local people5 steered clear of Block in the
beginning. Associating him with Freedom Riders who came into town to stir trouble and
then left the local people to deal with the reprisals that ensued, they told Block they did not
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want to have anything to do with ‘that mess’. This changed after their first mass meeting,
when Block taught freedom songs to those who came. People became receptive to Block
after that, asking him when they were meeting next so they could learn more freedom
songs. He thus began to use freedom songs not only to bring local people together but
also to hold them together. In the course of these ventures, a new frame of understanding
for what he was doing began to take shape in Block’s mind, namely, a sense for what made
people receptive to him, for how to overcome people’s fears, and for how to channel their
anger into constructive forms of resistance, for example, registering to vote. Inasmuch as
Block listened attentively and patiently to the local people, he learned not only what they
had to say, but also what they were yet struggling to express. In a matter of months, he was
thus able to identify where the movement would take root, namely among:
older people who were angry, who were looking for some kind of direction, for somebody
who could give form and expression to ideas and thoughts that they had had in mind for
years, to things that they wanted to do [but] just couldn’t bring together. (Block 1986)
It is to these people that Block would directly transmit the ﬁrst principle of organic social
change, that is, that they should harness the powers and possibilities that their lived experi-
ences afford.
Block got the local people to harness their own lived experiences by exposing them to
new or challenging endeavours – for example, performing new activities, operating in new
environments, or resisting the demands of their oppressors. The more the local people
attended to what they were experiencing in such endeavours, the more they engaged
their own powers of thinking, feeling, or acting to make sense of, or respond to, what is
unfolding there and then. Similarly, the stronger their determination in undertaking a par-
ticular endeavour, the more they drew on their own powers of thinking, feeling, or acting
in carrying that endeavour through. In the course of such lived experiences, they devel-
oped new frames of understanding for making sense of their own experiences, as well
as new attitudes (i.e. needs, desires, emotions, and aspirations).
Block facilitated such a lived experience when he took his first group of twenty people
to register at the courthouse. A Sheriff Smitty spat on Block’s face, threatened him with a
pistol, and ordered him to pack his bags and leave Greenwood immediately. Then came
Block’s reply:
Sheriff, if you don’t want to see me around here the next day, the next hour, the next minute,
or the next second, the best thing for you to do is to pack your bags and leave because I am
going to be here.
The people who came with him regained their own sense of courage from witnessing that.
When highway patrolmen followed them to their homes and took their names and
addresses down as a form of intimidation, some of them shouted: ‘You don’t scare me
no more. You don’t scare me no more’. They also began ‘to get out into the community
themselves and round up people [to] become involved in [the] movement’ (Block 1986).
In this episode, Block got the local people to draw on their own powers of thinking,
feeling, and acting to make sense of, and respond to, what unfolded at the courthouse.
Witnessing Block’s reply to the sheriff reassured them that Block would not leave them
under pressure of threat or out of fear for his own life. They thus developed a new
frame of understanding for what Block was doing: the boy they had once suspected of
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stirring up another ‘mess’ now affected them as a young brother who was willing to risk his
own life so they could become the first-class citizens they aspired to be. They also devel-
oped new attitudes. Block’s open display of resistance let them share in the feeling of
courage that got him to take a stand against an oppressor. So on being refused their
right to vote at the courthouse, their fears gave way to anger and a sense of determination.
Steeled by this newfound courage and determination, they went out into their commu-
nities to get others involved in the movement.
This process of organic social change developed further over a course of events that
began in October 1962, when the Leflore County Board of Supervisors decided to cut
off the distribution of commodities (i.e. oatmeal, rice, flour, and sugar). Over 20,000
poor black people in the county depended on those commodities to survive through the
winter months. Whereas previous white reprisals had cowed them into fear and resigna-
tion, this discontinuation of commodities only made them angry. This time, moreover,
Block and other SNCC staff were able to channel the local people’s anger into the move-
ment. On the 24th and 25th of February, 150 black people would go down to the court-
house to register. When Block got arrested on false charges for the seventh time, ‘over a
hundred protesting Negroes attended Block’s trial, overflowing city hall and shocking
city officials’ (Payne 2007, 2: 162). Even as reprisals from the white community escalated
– that is, two shootings per week, and police officers siccing dogs on those who were regis-
tering or protesting – the local black people of Leflore could no longer be deterred from
their commitment to become first-class citizens, and thus to changing Mississippi. By the
end of March, local people had taken over the movement and had begun directing it them-
selves. On the 27th of March, enraged by violent shootings at movement offices and black
people’s homes, over a hundred local people would march to the mayor’s office to demand
police protection.
In undertaking such risky and challenging endeavours, disadvantaged and oppressed
blacks in Leflore showed that their commitment to become first-class citizens had out-
weighed their fear and concern for themselves in the face of white retaliation. They had
thus begun to abide by the second principle of organic social change – that is, having a
commitment to change that is stronger than their feeling for self. Moreover, to the
extent that they began to take action against oppression on their own initiative, they
were now acting on their own understanding that they could only become first-class citi-
zens by changing Mississippi. They were thus also abiding by the third principle of organic
social change. As Mississippians who had once been disadvantaged and oppressed for
‘being niggers’ became skilled organisers, active citizens, and social reformers, their indi-
vidual transformations developed into the transformation of a people. Although such a
people remained different from mainstream society, the ways in which they differed no
longer conformed to oppressive frames of difference. As they then interacted with
people in mainstream society with their new modes of difference, they also compelled
mainstream society to change their frames of difference.6
§2 Conventional social change
There are many different kinds of social change besides organic social change. To exhibit
the distinctiveness of organic social change, I shall describe one contrasting kind of social
change that is close to it insofar as it also involves changing frames of difference specific to
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a particular race, class, sex, and the like, but differs from it insofar as the change is not
effected by the disadvantaged and oppressed themselves.7 Frames of difference perpetuate
as elements of the common pool of beliefs, be they tacit or explicit, about how people in
general behave or would behave. This common pool of beliefs informs not only people’s
expectations of particular disadvantaged and oppressed groups, but also their expectations
of one another with regard to these groups. For example, women in the workplace become
victims of stereotypes because men in powerful positions can reliably expect their male
peers (and even some women) to regard the women concerned in the same way. Similarly,
since the 1980s, the expectation had become widely shared that poor people would simply
grow dependent on welfare unless they were given incentives to work and become self-
reliant. These mutual or broadly shared expectations that draw on a common pool of
knowledge about people’s behaviour comprise what I call conventions. So for convenience,
I will call the contrast class we are now considering conventional social change.
Conventional social change is generally engineered by political actors and knowledge
experts. In the US context, ‘political actors’ refers to elected or appointed officials who
hold executive, legislative, or judicial powers, and the bureaucrats to whom they delegate
the responsibility of implementing policy decisions. These political actors rely in turn on
the work of knowledge experts – for example, sociologists, economists, policy analysts, or
political scientists. These experts are generally held to be in a better position than the dis-
advantaged and oppressed to examine what structural factors perpetuate disadvantage and
oppression (e.g. discriminatory practices, poor quality of schools, lack of affordable
housing), and how being affected by such structural factors correlate with belonging to
a particular race, class, sex, and the like. Expert studies can then serve as the basis for
the policy decisions that political actors make with regard to addressing disadvantage
and oppression.
Conventional social change involves two tiers of cooperation: the cooperation among
political actors and knowledge experts, and the cooperation expected of individuals
belonging to disadvantaged and oppressed groups. The first tier of cooperation is rather
limited in its efficacy with regard to changing oppressive frames of difference. When
experts form expectations that involve frames of difference, they are generally making sup-
positions with regard to what is present or past, or giving predictions about some future
state of affairs. It was, for example, a (controversial) study by the Centers for Disease
Control that first made the supposition linking AIDS to gay men’s promiscuous sexual
behaviour (Seidman 1988, 190). When liberal poverty experts expected certain groups
to become dependent, they were predicting the probable living conditions or life circum-
stances of specific groups – that is, ‘nonwhites, unmarried mothers, and high-school drop-
outs’ (Bane and Ellwood 1983, 16). Based on such suppositions or predictions, political
actors and experts may reach some consensus on the frame of difference they want to
change. Such consensus nonetheless prevails only within the confines of white papers
and special committee meetings.
In the meetings and decision-making processes of political actors, expectations take on
a moral garb. Here, expectations signify either demands for something as society’s due, or
preconceived ideas and opinions about people’s behaviour. Demanding something as
society’s due involves assumptions about desert and obligation that are grounded in back-
ground moral beliefs or attitudes. Expecting the poor to show willingness to work and a
sense of personal responsibility, for example, was explicitly premised on the so-called
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American values of positive work ethic and self-reliance (O’Connor 2009, 254). Precon-
ceived ideas about people’s behaviour are quite often revivals of past prejudices concerning
certain disadvantaged and oppressed groups. Howsoever the stereotypes of women in the
workplace may vary according to changing cultural codes, they all betray the prejudice that
women are not expected to wield power (Eagly 2012). Given the fierce antagonism
between America’s main political parties, moreover, even if some of these background
moral beliefs, moral attitudes, or preconceived ideas serve the needs and interests of dis-
advantaged and oppressed groups, there will be just as many that do not. In the end, pol-
itical actors and experts therefore end up passing the burden of conventional social change
to the second tier of cooperation – that is, cooperation from disadvantaged and oppressed
groups in the implementation of policy decisions.
To ensure such cooperation, experts and political actors form expectations that demand
something as society’s due. In this scenario, however, social change mainly turns on mod-
ifying the behaviour of the disadvantaged and oppressed. by making ‘them’ more like ‘us’.
The disadvantaged and oppressed become different from how they had been observed or
predicted to behave by living up to the expectations they form and internalise in the course
of taking part in the relevant institutions. With the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), for example, ‘most states now require reci-
pients to sign some form of personal responsibility plan that emphasizes that welfare
receipt is a contract: benefits are provided in return for the recipient’s pledge to carry
out certain activities’ (Loprest et al. 2000, 189). Here, cooperation turns on bringing the
disadvantaged and oppressed in accord with some set of beliefs or expectations, say,
about how educational attainment, marketable skills, or readiness for jobs translates to
favourable life outcomes or ideal life prospects. Unfortunately, despite having cooperated
on such terms, the disadvantaged and oppressed could still enjoy only as much of the
expected outcome as prevailing market forces, social norms, and moral attitudes would
allow. For example, with PRWORA’s strict time limit for former recipients to leave the
rolls and begin working, the single mothers who were working in 1997, though higher
than in past poverty bills, generally landed in low-wage jobs, and only 23% had health
insurance through their employer (Loprest et al. 2000, 193).
Hence, to the extent that disadvantaged and oppressed individuals cooperate with one
another as part of the process of conventional social change, their cooperation is incidental
(see e.g. Stack 1975). This is not an indictment in itself, but merely how the disadvantaged
and oppressed have come to see the situation on the basis of their lived experiences with
conventional social change. This predicament stands in stark contrast to the empowering
nature of cooperation in organic social change, as I presently show.
§3 The distinctive significance of organic social change
What distinguishes organic social change from conventional social change is the direct
and active participation of the disadvantaged and oppressed in driving the process by
which they transform themselves and one another so as to recast the frames of difference
that perpetuate their disadvantage and oppression. This distinctive importance of organic
social change arises from the empowering kind of cooperation that the disadvantaged and
oppressed get to enact in such a process. By contrast, the kind of cooperation that obtains
in conventional social change is premised largely on survival, not on growth. I shall now
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show that, in organic social change, the disadvantaged and oppressed do grow insofar as
their cooperation also involves empowering one another. I will anchor my illustration of
this empowering kind of cooperation to a concrete example, since what I am about to show
does not comport with how we normally think about cooperation. I will stick to the
example of how the local people of Mississippi recast their second-class citizenship in
the 1960s.
In the Mississippi movement, it was Bob Moses who most distinctly embodied and
exemplified the principles of organic social change. It was Moses whom Sam Block
respected the most among all the people who came through the movement. Block once
confessed that he always wanted to pattern himself and his mannerisms after Moses
(1986); other SNCC staff expressed similar sentiments. Historical accounts also suggest
that Block and other southerners in SNCC did come to exemplify Moses’s uncanny
ability to empower other people (Louis 1970; Coles 1983; Burner 1994; Payne 2007). So
in what follows, I will discuss how Moses empowered the local people in Mississippi
just by virtue of how he interacted or cooperated with them. In particular, I will show
that, through his mode of cooperation, Moses facilitated lived interactions and endeavours
in which disadvantaged and oppressedMississippians came to embody and enact the prin-
ciples of organic social change. They did this insofar as they also developed the primal
powers I mentioned in §1, namely, attunement, determination, and an attitude of open
and abiding patience towards themselves, towards one another, and towards the world
they lived in.
As a facilitator, Moses himself embodied the primal powers I have enumerated. His atti-
tude of open and abiding patience is what made his mode of cooperation distinctive. So I
will begin with his own account of how he cooperated with local people in Mississippi. In
an interview, he says:
Well, one of the things I felt in Mississippi was that, you always had to understate everything
because the problem itself was too big. So you couldn’t go around projecting what you were
going to do about the problem, right. What you had to show people was that you were actu-
ally biting off a small piece of the problem and you were actually doing that. (Payne 2006, 2:
175)
Here, Moses reports that he acquiesced not only in the complexity of what they were
dealing with, but also in the uncertainty of what he and his co-operators would accomplish
by their endeavour. Yet, this acquiescence in what he did not know in fact derives from his
open and abiding patience, not only towards himself and his actions, but also towards
what his co-operators were bringing to the endeavour. He did not know what they
could deliver because the outcome of the endeavour would depend not only on how he
responded to the situation, but also on how everyone else did. This shows, on the one
hand, how open Moses was to the powers and possibilities local people could bring to
bear on challenging situations. On the other hand, insofar as his patience also bid him
to simply abide by, or bear witness to, those powers and possibilities, he did not frame
their endeavour in terms of his own expectations about what they would accomplish.
Moses’s mode of cooperation was partly due to what Ella Baker, whomMoses regarded
as his spiritual mentor,8 had instilled in him, namely, that one ‘cannot lead a struggle that
involves masses of people without getting the people to understand what their potentials
are, what their strengths are’.9 But how does one get people who had lived under
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oppression to understand this? Baker herself once posed a variant of this question to
herself: how do you get people to participate in the decisions that affect their lives? This
was her reply:
I don’t have any cut pattern, except that I believe that people, when informed about the things
they are concerned with, will find a way to react. Now, whether their reactions are the most
desirable at any given stage depends, to a large extent, upon whether the people who are in the
controlling seat are open enough to permit people to react according to how they see the situ-
ation. In organizing a community, you start with people where they are. (Mueller 1990, 60)
In his cooperative endeavours with the local people of Mississippi, Moses therefore
allowed them to react according to how they saw the situation. But why must this
imply that he began with people where they were, and why does this matter? Moses con-
tinues from the remark cited above as follows:
I didn’t sit down and think this through but my reaction to the situation was, you don’t
mislead people by promising what you can’t deliver or you can’t really know what you
can deliver because you’re dealing now with people who had heard it all, across the years,
and seen it just get progressively [worse]. (Payne 2006, 2: 175)
This suggests that Moses did start from the unique predicament of black people in Mis-
sissippi: insofar as he did not presume to be in a privileged position to appraise and
address the situations that local people faced, he projected the very uncertainty involved
in those situations, albeit such as to enjoin and vindicate their response rather than to indi-
cate their ignorance or powerlessness.
I now want to show how Moses’s own mode of cooperation awakened the disadvan-
taged and oppressed people in Mississippi to a newfound sense of agency, one that
enabled them to transform themselves in deep and creative ways. Let us first consider
how Moses talked in his lived cooperative endeavours with local people: he felt that he
had ‘to talk only about what [they] were doing… and only to talk really in very specific
terms’ (Payne 2006, 2: 175). By framing their future actions in concrete and specific
terms, Moses was essentially getting his co-operators to think of concrete thoughts and
bodily movements that they would bring into the endeavour. On the outcome itself,
Moses deliberately pleaded silence. Under these conditions, once they were in the midst
of an endeavour, they were not thinking of themselves as agents producing some
outcome through their acts. Rather, they simply took themselves to be producing some-
thing with their own thoughts and bodily movements in direct response to the situation
that was unfolding. Moses therefore got his co-operators to make sense of their actions
through their own attunement to the unfolding lived experience.
While fully attuned to the situation, Moses’s co-operators were conscious of them-
selves in whatever powers of thinking, feeling, or acting went into the unfolding endea-
vour. That is to say, they felt those powers as their own, or as emanating from them.
Insofar as the disadvantaged and oppressed in Mississippi had such lived experiences,
they thereby came to embody the powers they had become conscious of. They could
therefore rely on those powers in dealing with other challenging endeavours. They
could also exhibit those powers as an example for others. This transformative experi-
ence nonetheless only got them to embody the first principle of organic social
change, that is, that they should harness the powers and possibilities their lived experi-
ences afford. If developing and embodying such powers had merely led them to think
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highly of themselves, they would fail to also embody and exemplify the second prin-
ciple, that is, that their commitment to change in society should be stronger than
their feeling for self.
Moses’s mode of cooperation had to have facilitated capacities other than attunement.
Debbie Louis, a civil rights author who had been part of the movement, provides our
missing piece in her particularly illuminating account of transformative experiences in
the movement. Referring to the kind of transformation that results from lived experience,
she writes:
Perhaps it can be viewed as the sudden discovery of one’s own individual power […] or
perhaps more simply one’s ability to determine [one’s] own existence. For the [lived] experi-
ence itself came from one’s own decision to act in a particular way upon one’s own con-
ception of truth, and accept the consequences of that act. The ensuing discovery, once that
decision had been made and irrevocably acted upon, was that those consequences could be
survived. What this leads to is the recognition of the act, and not the consequence, as the
important thing in relation to oneself. It is, in other words, learning that one can do what
one wants to do. (Louis 1970, 114, emphasis in the original)
What Louis illustrates in this passage is the concept of determination. A person has deter-
mination when in her actions, she simply takes herself to be doing what she wants to do. It
is her desire, in other words, that moves and binds her to her acts. Because such a desire
sufﬁces for orienting her actions, she can remain committed to what she is doing even if
she does not know what would come of it, or even if she had been told that what would
come of it was not what she wanted.
Reverting now to the Mississippi example, recall that what the disadvantaged and
oppressed people in Mississippi essentially wanted to do was change oppressive frames
of difference such as second-class citizenship, being inferior, and the like. Indeed for
those who had lived through what it was like to be disadvantaged and oppressed on
account of ‘being a nigger’, their desire to change that frame of difference was not only
stronger than their feeling for self, but had also become as immediate as their feeling of
self. In other words, they did not need prior reasons or motivations to sustain this
desire’s claim on their decisions and actions. To fold this point back to Louis’s account,
the desire to change oppressive frames of difference was just the sort of desire that devel-
oped into determination, once people recognised the act as the important thing in relation
to them. With such determination, they also had no need for reasons to validate that what
they had done was important. As a case in point, because they wanted to change their
second-class citizenship, they were determined to register to vote even though the vast
majority were not actually getting registered.10
To the extent that Moses’s co-operators got to embody determination, they also came to
embody the second principle of organic social change: their commitment to change in
society prevailed over their feeling for self. Embodying the first two principles of
organic social change signified a deep personal transformation. Insofar as the powers
they came to embody opened up possibilities for further new or challenging ventures,
their personal transformations were also creative. So far, however, all I have shown is
how Moses’s mode of cooperation enabled deep and creative personal transformations.
I still need to show how such transformations translate to deep and creative social
change. So the residual question is this: what drew these transformed individuals together
to constitute a transformed people that also changed society?
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I already provided part of the answer in §1, where I laid out the process by which the
disadvantaged and oppressed developed new values and ways of life (e.g. first-class citizen-
ship and political participation) that made them a new people. We can also rest assured
that people in the movement saw what they were doing as a struggle of one people. So
the part that has yet to be answered is what fostered this feeling of solidarity. It would
be a mistake to invoke what black people in Mississippi had before the movement.
Although that undoubtedly played a role, we still need a kind of solidarity that held
together people who were now changed, and were committed to changing further so
that they can change society. To arrive at this kind of solidarity, I want to turn to a
remark Moses made about his father. When asked what it was that predisposed him to
Ella Baker’s grassroots approach to social change, Moses would attribute it to his
father’s influence. His father, Moses says,
has this great capacity to deal with the person that’s presented in front of him and sort of see
through the various kinds of stereotypes, so he’s always dealing with the actual person and
then within that also has this capacity to look for and respond to the human qualities of
that person, so he is not predisposed to put that person down. (Payne 2006, 2: 185)
Moses also discerned how easy it was for people not only to develop stereotypes, but also
to interact with other people on that basis. He noticed a shift in how people related to him
when he began to get some press. He says: ‘the reaction is they are reading about you and
so they begin to react to you based on what they read rather than what you had before.
Which is [they’re] reacting to [you] based on your interactions’ (Payne 2006, 2: 187).
In other words, because part of what people would be reacting to in a cooperative endea-
vour was each one of their co-operators, it was important that Moses’s co-operators were
dealing with the actual Moses throughout the endeavour.
But why was this important? Moses only said that if people had stopped relating to him
solely based on their lived interactions, he could no longer organise those people. So what
follows is a philosophical account of why this consideration mattered based on third-party
accounts of what Moses was like as a ‘leader’ in the movement. Because Moses did embody
the capacity he saw in his father – that is, of responding to people’s human qualities – he
was uniquely able to channel this capacity towards empowering his disadvantaged and
oppressed co-operators in the unfolding moments of a lived interaction. Moses’s co-oper-
ators felt his reaction to what they said or did as a direct and dynamic response to their own
human qualities. When such a response took place precisely at that moment when a co-
operator had become conscious or grounded in her powers in the manner discussed above,
what it essentially did was convey to that person: that power is yours.
Although this is propositionally the same as what they had become conscious of in
attending to what they did, the feeling is in fact significantly different for at least two
reasons. One, what played out here was no longer one’s relation to oneself but rather
being regarded by another human being. Two, what Moses awakened in someone to
whom he gave such a response was her value as a human being. Now when people describe
Moses, the terms ‘different’, ‘unique’, ‘rare’, and ‘exceptional’ invariably come up. Disad-
vantaged and oppressed people generally felt valued and respected among their kin, whom
they typically considered to be more similar to them than different from them. From
people they regarded more as different from them than similar to them, they typically
felt demeaned or denigrated. Because they would have regarded Moses as both different
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from them and similar to them, either aspect could come up in an interactive or coopera-
tive endeavour. When the aspect of difference prevailed, they lived through the unique
experience of feeling valued and empowered. That is to say, they experienced what it
was like to cooperate where each member, instead of aiming for a goal that the community
or someone else had determined for them, used her or his own lived experiences as a
resource for knowing what needed to be done and how to respond to challenging
situations.
That very experience would have in turn awakened the local people that their sense of
community could only be enriched rather than undermined if each member could freely
express her or his own singularity. They would have also learned that they should value
each other’s differences by responding to each others’ human qualities, and that they
must therefore struggle to harness this capacity in their lived interactions lest they suc-
cumbed to the frames of difference that mediated how people in broader society related
to one another. Out of such experience and insights, they would eventually develop the
same open and abiding patience towards themselves and other people that Moses embo-
died and exemplified. With such patience, they could then also enact the empowering
mode of cooperation that Moses enacted.
§4 Reply to objection 1
Given the distinctive mode of cooperation I just described, one might object that my
account is not consistent. On the one hand, when distinguishing organic social change
from conventional social change, I assert that in organic social change the disadvantaged
and oppressed themselves drive the process of changing the frames of difference specific to
their race, class, sex, and the like. On the other hand, in the mode of cooperation I invoke
to illustrate the distinctive value of organic social change, it turns out that facilitators (i.e.
outsiders) play an essential role. Had the facilitators not been there to help, the local people
would not have been able to transform themselves and one another in the ways required
by organic social change. If the facilitators drive the process through which the people
recast their second-class citizenship, then, so the objection goes, either what I discuss
here is actually a type of conventional social change or else I mischaracterise the distinc-
tion between organic social change and conventional social change. Let me address this
objection.
Inasmuch as I believe that facilitators do play an essential role in driving organic social
change through their cooperative endeavours with the local people, I must concede that
the local people do not drive the process of recasting oppressive frames of difference all
by themselves. However, there are two reasons why the disadvantaged and oppressed
themselves still drive this process. One, the local people undergo the deep and creative per-
sonal transformations required by organic social change only to the extent that they also
play an active role in those endeavours in which facilitators are involved. Two, such deep
and creative personal transformations only become the transformation of a people by
virtue of how the local people cooperate among themselves or interact with one
another, absent any facilitator. I will also show that oppressive frames of difference
cannot be recast unless the local people undertake these two roles. By establishing these
points, I will have also shown that facilitators do not drive the process of recasting oppres-
sive frames of difference all by themselves either. The objection is therefore wide of the
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mark, since the salience and necessity of the contribution to organic social change made by
the disadvantaged and oppressed themselves remain adequate to distinguish it from con-
ventional social change.
The local people must play an active role even when they cooperate with facilitators
because deep and creative personal transformations can only develop from what the
local people harness out of their own lived experiences. That is to say, such transform-
ations cannot take place unless the local people experience for themselves what it is like
to carry out an act or activity that oppressive frames of difference have long led them
to believe as not within their rights or capacities. So at minimum, the local people must
not only engage their own powers of thinking, feeling, or acting in responding to new
or challenging situations, but also realise new possibilities of experience and action.
Moreover, awakening to such powers and possibilities only marks the beginning of
their transformation. For that transformation to carry on, the local people must continue
to harness those powers and possibilities towards changing oppressive frames of differ-
ence. They can do this only to the extent that they sustain, or even increase, their partici-
pation in driving organic social change. For such extended and committed participation,
they must overcome the forces of habit, the adverse consequences of reprisals from their
oppressors, the censure and resistance of their kin, friends, peers, and neighbours, and the
complaisance and complacency that set in from confusing favourable outcomes with social
change. It is over the course of harnessing their own lived experiences and interactions to
overcome these challenges that the local people develop those new ways of thinking and
feeling that displace or dissolve oppressive frames of difference. Hence, unless the local
people undertake the active roles I just described, they cannot recast oppressive frames
of difference.
I will now show how the local people contribute to turning these personal transform-
ations into their transformation as a people. Those who have cooperated with facilitators
become agents of organic social change to the extent that they enact the facilitators’ mode
of cooperation when they cooperate with other people in their communities. Through
such mode of cooperation, they not only awaken their own people to their powers and
possibilities, but also encourage them to harness those powers and possibilities towards
transforming themselves, and thus towards taking part in organic social change. Even
as local agents carry this mode of cooperation forward into their own communities,
however, they must still graft it onto prevailing channels and patterns of social relations.
To such extent, whatever new elements they adopt from facilitators do not simply supplant
their old way of life, but rather change it from within. Moreover, this change happens at
the roots of that way of life, namely, their lived experiences in shared and collective endea-
vours. Because the facilitators’ mode of cooperation is assimilated in this way, it can con-
tinue to transform the local people, and thus drive organic social change, even long after
facilitators have left their communities. This also explains why the local people must be
able to cooperate in such a mode even in those lived endeavours that do not involve
facilitators.
What local agents also carry forward from facilitators is the disposition to defer to, and
value, the singular lived experience of each and every human being. Through this disposi-
tion, they get to harness their own and one another’s singularities when they interact or
cooperate. When the local people interact and cooperate on these terms, each participant’s
contribution to the interaction or endeavour becomes a full-fledged decision or action.
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Over time, such decisions and actions equip them with a new sense of agency, namely, a
sense that they can shape their own lives as well as the future of their communities. The
local people also develop a new kind of solidarity – in particular, one that mediates
relations among people who not only strive to keep changing so as to embody new
modes of difference, but also value one another’s singularities or differences.
Ultimately, the local people recast oppressive frames of difference only to the extent
that they are also able to compel mainstream society to recast those frames of difference.
The local people can do this precisely insofar as they have transformed themselves as a
people in the ways I just described. Through the way they interact with one another,
and cooperate among themselves, they have not only come to embody and exemplify
values and ways of life that no longer conform to oppressive frames of difference; they
have also developed a distinctive kind of solidarity that mainstream society must
reckon with.
§5 Reply to objection 2
Even granting the foregoing account of how local people can drive deep and creative social
change, one might nevertheless object that my contrast between organic social change and
conventional social change is too abstract, universal, and dualistic to capture the dynamic
of situated social change in different times and places. My examples, while exclusively
drawn from the US, have by and large been abstracted from their context. Inasmuch as
my analysis lacks sensitivity to the importance of context and the role of history, it fails
to adequately account for the role that institutions play in securing sustainable and trans-
formative social change, as in the case of the cooperation between the working class move-
ment and institutions in Nordic welfare states. By the same token, my analysis tends to
idealise the ability of local grassroots actors to create significant social change. Given
the lack of context, it is unclear what specific dynamic of social change my examples
are supposed to demonstrate that might be useful for understanding other concrete his-
torical processes of social change.
Let me begin my reply by situating the Mississippi Movement in its proper historical
and institutional context. In the early 1960s, black people in the south had no recourse
to major political institutions (i.e. the electoral system, the court system) to bring about
significant social change. In Mississippi in particular, white resistance to black political
participation was rooted in an ideology of racial difference that cast ‘the Negro [… as] con-
genitally unqualified to exercise the most responsible duty of citizenship’.11 This ideology
saw fulfilment not only through the poll taxes and literacy tests mandated by the state con-
stitution, but also through the rampant discriminatory practices of local registrars and the
various forms of coercion and violence that local citizens and law enforcement officials,
with the support and cooperation of the state’s political and economic elites, perpetrated
on black Mississippians who sought to register (McMillen 1977).
Meanwhile, federal response to the conditions in Mississippi had been restrained and
slow. Even though key federal actors – for example, John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy,
Burke Marshall and other legal officers in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Depart-
ment – did convey stronger aspirations to end racial discrimination in the south than pre-
vious administrations, these aspirations were tempered by a countervailing pair of
concerns: (i) that the severity of white resistance to black political participation, especially
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in Mississippi, would require massive federal intervention and (ii) that such intervention
would pre-empt the due course of local political processes, particularly the process in
which local officials become both responsive and accountable to their own constituency,
including those with whom they clashed or disagreed (Marshall 1964; Schlesinger 1978;
Belknap 1984).
In reply to the objection, I would now like to expound on what the foregoing context
illuminates about the Mississippi movement, particularly with regard to the respective role
of federal or state institutions and local grassroots actors in driving social change. First, I
must clarify that insofar as my contrast between organic social change and conventional
social change distinguishes between two sets of actors – that is, those who are disadvan-
taged and oppressed vis-à-vis those who are not – this contrast refers specifically to the
process in which oppressive frames of difference are changed. Provided the contrast is
viewed in these terms, all that is implied in delineating the disadvantaged and oppressed
as the ones driving this process of social change is the following: this process, insofar as a
significant part of its impetus and momentum derives from people’s lived experience of
oppression, must unfold according to a different set of principles than the ones commonly
advanced in political theory; in particular, the principles of organic social change foster an
instinctive desire for social change that brings and binds people together into deeply trans-
formative contexts of social action and social cooperation – that is, contexts that imbue
new meanings and value to the difference they embody and the difference they perceive
in others and thus enable them to eventually recast oppressive frames of difference.
This is the main dynamic that the concept of organic social change seeks to illuminate.
Before I expound on this dynamic, I would like to first clarify the role of institutions in
securing social change on this framework.
Insofar as institutions play a crucial role in shaping the context in which people in
democratic societies act and cooperate, institutions must also play a crucial role in the
process of social change I just described. Institutions can facilitate this process, for
example, as would in fact happen with the present example beginning the summer of
1963, when rising protests compelled the Kennedy administration to push for stronger
civil rights legislation (Brauer 1977; Andrews and Gaby 2015). Institutions can even
initiate it, as in the case of how theWomen’s Department (Zhenotdel) of the Russian Com-
munist Party mobilised and empowered working and peasant women in 1917 to 1930. To
the extent that my analysis of organic social change scarcely mentions institutions, this is
largely because of three crucial considerations specific to the historical example and period
that I analyse: (i) local actors and state institutions vigorously resisted social change; (ii)
federal actors and institutions, constrained by historical precedent and political circum-
stances, remained cautious about having any direct involvement in bringing about decisive
change in Mississippi; and (iii) SNCC organisers like Block and Moses neither understood
nor framed their endeavours with local people in Mississippi as part of a broader effort to
cooperate with federal or local state institutions. Hence, the concept of organic social
change neither denies nor occludes the role that institutions play in engendering social
change; rather, it merely draws attention to the impetus and momentum for social
change that the disadvantaged and oppressed themselves are able to create, particularly
insofar as existing institutions and social arrangements remain unresponsive to their
need and aspiration to develop meaningful social relations with others and to engage in
creative and dynamic forms of social interactions and cooperative endeavours.12
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To address the concern that I am idealising the ‘local’, I would now like to substantiate
how theMississippimovement exemplifies what I earlier claimed as the distinctive dynamic
involved in the concept of organic social change. The main impetus for the Mississippi
movement came, on the one hand, from young southern blacks who, beginning February
1960, gave public expression to their deep yearning to change the attitudes and expectations
that attached to their skin colour in a wave of boycotts, sit-in demonstrations, and school
desegregation campaigns across the South. On the other hand, on seeing the opportunity
for change that this sudden surge in youth activism presented, local black leaders inMissis-
sippi were able to give their own deeply held aspirations a specific form and expression: they
wanted to become first-class citizens (Block 1986; Moses and Cobb 2001; Driskell 2006).
Driven by this desire, these local leaders had been the ones who proposed voter registration
(as opposed to direct action or desegregation campaigns) as the cooperative endeavour
around which SNCC organisers like Sam Block and Bob Moses would organise people in
the majority black counties of the Mississippi Delta.13
The growing numbers of people who then got involved in the movement would then
provide significant momentum to the process of social change once they also developed
the desire to become first-class citizens. Here, it is worth noting that black people in Mis-
sissippi could not have developed this desire simply from doing their part in existing pol-
itical institutions inasmuch as the experience of registering to vote still entailed
humiliation and intimidation. Rather, they came to develop such a desire in the course
of interacting and cooperating with SNCC organisers and other people who were involved
in the movement. In other words, it made a difference that the local people were interact-
ing with the likes of Block and Moses, rather than only with local registrars or Justice
Department lawyers. Had my account been dualistic, I would have simply left this distinc-
tion to rest on the supposed difference between oppressed blacks and privileged whites, or
as the objection has suggested, between local grassroots actors and agents of political insti-
tutions. Instead, in my analysis of organic social change, I have substantiated this differ-
ence in terms of the distinctive sensibilities that persons bring to their interactions by
virtue of their lived experience of oppression.
So for example, insofar as what moved SNCC organisers to initiate organic social
change was a deep yet largely inchoate yearning to change oppressive frames of difference
that had taken root in formative experiences of oppression, they were able to inhabit and
develop cooperative endeavours with local people that did not have clear predefined goals
or expectations. Furthermore, insofar as the likes of Block and Moses have themselves
experienced what it was like to be humiliated, threatened, or beaten and how to lean
and draw on the basic human powers of thinking, feeling, and acting that such situations
could neither crush nor contain, they were more attuned and sensitive to the qualities that
are distinctive to the persons with whom they interacted and cooperated. They therefore
deferred to the local people with regard to appraising situations or making decisions rel-
evant to their own lives because they recognised the indigenous and creative powers that
those people would bring to the situations they faced.
Lastly, because SNCC organisers understood how easily people absorbed and interna-
lised frames of understanding that often abstracted from the singular qualities that each
person expressed in ongoing interactions, they not only favoured face-to-face interactions,
but also created a rich and dynamic context for action and cooperation in which people
could grow. In particular, even as the movement was built on local resources (e.g. churches
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as meeting spaces, social networks) that gave people a sense of security and continuity, it
was also enriched through spontaneous traditions like mass meetings and freedom songs
and through the civic engagement programmes of the Citizenship Schools. Within this
context, local people gained meaningful exposure to community activities and political
action that centred on voter registration while also imbuing them with new insights
and skills to address other problems and challenges facing their communities (Street
2012, 197–8; Gillespie 2014). Such a rich context not only allowed and moved people to
express the full depth and complexity of their singular qualities, but also sensitised
them to perceive the singular qualities of others.
In this process, it was not an (abstract) sense of shared oppression or common human-
ity that brought and bound people together but rather desires and aspirations for social
change whose spirit depended on the movement but whose ultimate substance and signifi-
cance were left for each person to define and articulate. Once such desires and aspirations
for social change had usurped the claims of oppressive frames of difference on how local
black people perceived and engaged one another, the attitudes and expectations they even-
tually formed concerning their own social situation and life prospects depended less on
how others expected them to behave than on what they actually managed to understand
and accomplish in their own personal and cooperative endeavours. These lived experi-
ences and endeavours thus served as fertile ground from which they then developed
and negotiated new terms in which their difference must be perceived. Over time, they
were also able to articulate new possibilities for cooperation among themselves and set
the terms in which other social actors had to interact and cooperate with them.
Such was the process of social change in which the singularity of a person like Fannie
Lou Hamer could emerge. A poor sharecropper who had to drop out of school when she
was eight, Hamer had embodied a difference that people feared, pitied, or denigrated. But
since her involvement in the movement, she would cut a figure that confounded and dis-
rupted the attitudes and expectations that attached to the categories of poor, black, rural,
female, militant. In rebutting charges that she was a Communist, she would affirm that
‘she knew as much about communism as “a horse do about Christmas”’ (Cobb 1992,
244). In sharp contrast to Martin Luther King’s eloquent cosmopolitan address that sum-
moned a vision of America as ‘a nation that cares about justice, that lives in democracy and
that inures the rights of the downtrodden’,14 Hamer’s testimony before the Credentials
Committee at the 1964 Democratic National Convention was largely a narration of her
own lived experience of oppression. This testimony nonetheless proved deeply transfor-
mative for black people in Mississippi: the questions that Hamer put to the committee pro-
voked similar questions for them by the light of their own lived experiences, thus planting
seeds, as it were, for their own growth and transformation.
Conclusion
In organic social change, people who are disadvantaged and oppressed recast the frames of
difference relating to their race, class, sex, or ability by driving their own and one another’s
transformations. Through such transformations, they develop new modes of difference,
both as individuals and as a people. As individuals, the disadvantaged and oppressed
develop new modes of difference over the course of inhabiting and harnessing their
own lived experiences. As a people, they distinguish themselves from other peoples in
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how they interact and cooperate with one another. Insofar as what animates their inter-
actions are their direct and dynamic responses to one another’s human qualities, their
embodied differences shape one another’s lives in mutually empowering and nurturing
ways. In their cooperative endeavours each co-operator’s abilities and contributions
count in their full measure because they value and harness one another’s differences.
What I just described are the ways in which our remote ancestors must have interacted
and cooperated with one another in order to flourish, and not merely survive. What I have
illustrated in this essay is an attempt to recover some of that humanity, drawn from testi-
monies of disadvantaged andoppressed peoplewho spoke from their own lived experiences.
So to the extent that we who are more privileged defer to the value they saw in that attempt,
we should also examine how we frame difference, why we cannot bring ourselves to change
them, and what significance we allot in our social and political life for those differences that
people come to embody from the richness and complexity of lived human experience.
Notes
1. This is adapted from Ella Baker’s conviction that the disadvantaged and oppressed ‘had
something within their power that they could use’ to understand and address their social situ-
ation, and to protect themselves against violence or injustice (Baker 2000, 468).
2. This is adapted from Charles Sherrod’s statement about what it takes to change society: ‘our
commitment to change in this society has got to be stronger than our feeling for self’. Sherrod
issued this statement in his closing remarks to the ‘Freedom Summer Reviewed’ panel con-
ference held in Tougaloo College on 30 October 1979. In a position paper written in Novem-
ber 1964, Sherrod offers a similar remark, suggesting that the struggle must not ‘be based on
the wisdom of the pinched toe and the empty belly’ but rather on ‘a description of what we’d
die for, what we want, principles of action’ (Sherrod 1964). Similar views have been expressed
by SNCC leaders Bob Moses and James Forman (see Warren 1965).
3. This statement is adapted from the depiction of black people in the South that Mississippi
journalist Dickson (1907) offers as one of the main justifications for white supremacy in a
lead article featured in The Saturday Evening Post. This particular depiction of black
people is also what triggered the searing formative experience of oppression that would even-
tually move Block (the key figure in the example I will discuss shortly) to get involved in the
struggle for social change (1986).
4. To my knowledge, the present example has not been analysed to specifically engage the litera-
ture on difference, empowerment, and social cooperation in democratic theory and political
philosophy, although the theme of empowerment receives thoughtful discussion in Shor
(2004), Ransby (2005), Payne (2007), and Anderson (2010). Moreover, to foreground the
voices and lived experiences of the very people involved in social struggles, my discussion
and analysis of SNCC’s activities in Mississippi draw primarily on oral history interviews of
key figures behind the Mississippi movement, particularly Sam Block, Bob Moses, Hollis
Watkins, Willie Peacock, Joyce Ladner, and June Johnson (Moses 1983, 1984a, 1984b;
Watkins 1985), and from the insightful interviews documented by Warren (1965). Whereas
published accounts of the transformative impacts of the Mississippi movement have tended
to focus on the Freedom Summer that took place in the summer of 1964, my analysis concen-
trates on SNCC’s activities leading up to the summer of 1963. Formore comprehensive studies
on SNCC, the classic text is Zinn (2002); Polletta (2002) provides a rich and thorough analysis
andHogan (2007) gives amasterly depiction of the atmosphere and dynamic of themovement.
5. My use of the term ‘local people’ follows the definition provided by Alan Draper – that is,
those who played public leadership roles in their communities in support of civil rights.
Local people encouraged their neighbors to attend civil rights rallies, led people up the
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courthouse steps to register to vote, opened their homes to civil rights workers, and
headed efforts to desegregate public accommodations. Local people comprised their
communities’ political vanguard whose behavior and leadership set the example for
others to follow. (2016, 274)
6. These assessments of how movement involvement transformed black Mississippians are
based primarily on claims made by people who were directly involved in the Mississippi
movement (see Warren 1965; Coles 1966; Louis 1970; Feingold et al. 1974). For those who
are sceptical of such testimonies, Andrews (2004) offers an objective and thorough assess-
ment of the movement’s enduring legacy in Mississippi, particularly with regard to political
power, education, and social policies.
7. This contrast falls in line with how the literature on social categories distinguishes between
observers, that is, those inured to ‘abstracting key elements and simplifying the categories
that they use’, and actors, that is, those who ‘challenge the simplicity of the categories and
the inflexibility of their application’ (Deaux 2012, 206; 214).
8. In 1978, on the occasion of Ella Baker’s 75th birthday, Bob Moses referred to Baker as the
‘fundi’, Swahili for ‘the person in the community who masters a craft with the help of the
community and teaches it to other people’. Moses added that this craft gets passed on
‘without becoming institutionalized’. See Grant (1998, 211–2).
9. From a speech by Ella Baker entitled ‘The BlackWoman in the Civil Rights Struggle’, delivered
at the Institute for the BlackWorld inAtlanta, Georgia in 1969. Reprinted inGrant (1998, 231).
10. ‘Of the fifteen hundred blacks applying in Leflore County over the next six months, only fifty
would be registered’. Mississippi Free Press, April 6, 1963: 3.
11. This appears in a statement from a 1907 speech by former Mississippi Governor James
K. Vardaman that the Citizens’ Council still deemed fit to reprint in its standard packet of
literature in the 1960s, and that SNCC cites as a reflection of the state’s stance on voting
rights (see pamphlet ‘Mississippi: Subversion of the Right to Vote’).
12. This process falls in line with the distinctive dynamic of what Johan P. Olsen, in his analysis
of modern welfare states, calls ‘open structures’ – in contrast to hierarchical and specialised
structures, open structures coincide with ‘a period that invited experimentation with identi-
ties, solutions, and allies; and… generated a demand for symbolic-expressive behavior that
representative institutions were unable to meet, or meet in time’ (1983, 35).
13. Bearing a letter of introduction from Ella Baker, Bob Moses traveled into the Delta in the
summer of 1960 and met a 49-year old World War II veteran named Amzie Moore, who
then introduced him to other black leaders in the Delta. Amzie Moore also proposed the
idea of voter registration campaigns at a SNCC conference in Atlanta on 14 October 1960
(Moses and Cobb 2001, 42). Only in June 1961, by contrast, would Robert Kennedy argue
that ‘voter registration would be far more productive than demonstrations’ in a meeting
with leaders of civil rights organisations. Before that meeting, the Civil Rights Commission
had also issued a report demonstrating that voter registration had no discernible effect on the
southern caste system (Brauer 1977, 112–6; Schlesinger 1978, 314).
14. FromStatement before theCredentialsCommittee. 22August 1964.TheKingCenter. Reference:
http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/statement-credentials-committee-democrati
c-national-committee.
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